We argue that they can be used by incumbents (governments) to elude normal budgetary constraints and anticipate infrastructure spending. We show that renegotiations foster lowballing in ex ante auctions and both include additional compensations for the works originally contracted and add works not contemplated in the original contract.
Nevertheless, spending anticipation is not inherent to PPPs, but the consequence of defective accounting standards. We show that if PPP investments are included as investments in the public budget spending caps prevent anticipation.
Our thesis has three observable implications....http://scid.stanford.edu/system/files/shared/Galetovic_-englisth_version.pdf
Soft Budgets, Renegotiations and Public-Private Partnerships, by Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer, Alexander Galetovic, May 2009
Ver também a aplicação da teoria de jogos à renegociação de contratos de concessão e PPP
VER recomendação sobre a aplicação do art. 31 da Lei de Enquadramento Orçamental