(ver em Português abaixo)
The ECB announced
today that it will buy € 60 Bln of assets each month until Sep-2016.
Unlike
other central banks, which have the key monetary policy objective of keeping inflation within an acceptable band around
2%, the ECB is also being called on to revive the Eurozone economy and to save the
single currency, the Euro.
As the ECB
launches a new Quantitative Easing program, which can be seen as QE 2 European style, it will again increase its balance sheet to the level of €
3,000 Bln topped in 2012 with bank emergency funding, but which came
down to close to € 2,000 Bln in 2014. That earlier QE 1 allowed banks of the
most indebted countries such as Portugal to draw funds from the ECB to lend to
local borrowers in order to enable them to "repay" the international
creditors, including official creditors such as the EIB. This substitution of
original creditors greatly benefitted the main creditors who had let too much,
such as German, French, English and Spanish banks, and so had the support of
those national authorities.
But if with
the initial QE 1 ECB released many of the international creditors, debtors hardly
received any debt relief, with the exception of the debt forgiveness granted to
Greece. Since then, the increase in spreads and the fall in inflation has
increased the real burden of debt in other indebted countries, which is
generally recognized as an untenable situation.
We must
reduce the real debt burden of the overly indebted borrowers, either through
debt restructuring or through increasing their income, though inflation,
exports, etc. Instead, we live with
"zombies", companies and banks that are hardly alive.
Strangely, countries
like Germany which most benefited from such debt relief in the past have short
memories of this, and are now the most insistent on defending their creditor
rights, and on rejecting responsibility for their part in the European subprime
credit bubble.
But a
central bank is not a "jack of all trades" and monetary policy cannot,
alone, revive each of the 18 diverging Eurozone economies, much less in the
current "liquidity trap", when
interest rates are near zero and increases in the money supply do not translate
into increased economic activity or even into inflation.
What can be
expected from the new Eurozone QE 2 is that the Euro, already at the minimum of
11 years, will depreciate, and the prices of financial assets such as equities
and (risk free) bonds will increase. Given the reliance on " trickling down ", reductions in the cost and increases in the
volume of (risk-bearing) credit to the real economy are unlikely, as are increases in the most
important "price" of all, nominal wages " in the distressed
countries,
The 18 Eurozone
countries are increasingly polarized and divergent, so increasing "low-risk”
liquidity may help a little, but cannot guarantee boosting credit to real
economies where it is urgently needed, and upon
which debt repayment capacities depend.
The flood
of liquidity in Frankfurt will reach Amarante in an eye-dropper.
This is
because more (risk-free) liquidity does not guarantee more credit capacity, more bank capital or more abilty to
evaluate projects and borrowers and to manage credit portfolios. Liquidity is general.
Credit is specific, directed, takes risk, assumes losses and undertakes restructurings
when needed. The are the true functions of intermediation which the Eurozone
financial system is failing to carry out now.
The ECB has
been buying "covered bonds" from banks, backed by credit assets to
the private sector and businesses. In 2014, the ECB bought € 30 Bln of bank
bonds and less than € 3 Bln of asset securitizations. This was still very
little, but it's still more than the d € 22 Bln of EIB Global Loans repassed
by local banks to SMEs. As the official development bank
of the European Union, the EIB would be the institution specifically mandated
to finance the real economy, but it hampered by a inappropriate “risk free” focus and by few
“real financing” instruments such as export credit.
What is at
stake is dramatic for the 18 countries of the Eurozone and the EU overall, because the continuing economic weaknesses and
deflation will provoke more recession
(the third in five years) and increase in the real burden of debt.
But the new
QE 2 Quantitative Easing is no panacea. What is missing is fiscal and budget
stimulus in creditor and surplus countries. Germany is even unwilling to borrow in order
to invest in the badly needed renewal of their infrastructure. So the QE 2 will
not solve the excessive debt problem nor the lack of income of the debtor
countries, which requires an increase of exports and rebalancing intra-Eurozone
trade.
Let us be
clear: The biggest threat to the Euro is
the diverging fortunes and trade imbalances among the 18 Eurozone countries.
Thus, the
success of the new Eurozone QE 2 Quantitative Easing will be measured not in the
falling yields of German bunds, but in the falling intra-Eurozone trade
imbalances, not by the size of the ECB balance sheet, but by the availability
of export credit to struggling exporters in Portugal, Spain and other indebted
countries.
In the case of severe distress, in the Eurozone it has always been the debtors, or taxpayers, who bear the costs of adjustment, rather than the creditors responsible for the credit bubble. If Germany
and other creditors could promote expansionary policies, and share the cost of
adjustment of the excessive credit, this would separate the problem of credit from
the problem of currency. After all, creditor countries need to undertake their own
“structural reforms" as much as the debtor countries.
Because the
unsustainable debt is unsustainable, be it in Euros or in any other currency.
Saving the
Euro is not enough.
It is
essential to Save Our Societies, massacred by the very high
unemployment and gripped by the lack of liquidity.
Mariana ABRANTES de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Portugal, 22-Jan-2015
O BCE anunciou hoje que vai comprar €60 Bln de activos por mês até Set-2016.
Ao contrário de outros bancos centrais, que tem como principal objectivo da politica monetária conter a inflação dentro de uma banda aceitável cerca dos 2%, o BCE é chamado a reanimar a economia da Eurozone e salvar a Moeda Única, o Euro.
Com um novo programa de Quantitative Easing, QE 2 à europeia, o BCE volta aumentar o seu balanço de tinha ultrapassado €3 000 Bln em 2012 com os financiamentos bancários de emergência, mas que desceu para perto de €2 000 Bln em 2014. Aquele QE 1 em tempo de crise permitiu que os bancos dos países mais endividados como Portugal fossem buscar fundos ao BCE para emprestar às empresas para que estas pudessem "reembolsar" outros credores internacionais, inclusive o BEI. Esta substituição de credores favoreceu bastante os principais credores, bancos alemães, franceses, ingleses e espanhóis, e por isso teve o apoio dessas autoridades.
Mas se o QE 1 do BCE libertou muitos dos credores internacionais, os devedores pouco beneficiaram, fora o perdão de divida concedida à Grécia. E entretanto o aumento das spreads e a queda da inflação fez aumentar a carga real do endividamento nos outros países endividados, uma situação reconhecidamente insustentável.
Ou reduzimos a carga real da dívida através da reestruturação ou através do aumento dos rendimentos, inflação, exportações, etc. Entretanto, convivemos com "zombies", empresas e bancos que estão vivos, mas pouco.
Mas um Banco Central não é “pau para toda a obra” e a politica monetária a cargo da Autoridade Monetária não consegue, sozinha, reanimar a economia, muito menos nesta conjuntura de “liquidity trap”, quando as taxas de juro estão perto do zero e aumentos na massa monetária não se traduzem nem em aumento de actividade económica nem sequer em inflação.
Nesta Eurozone cada vez mais polarizada e divergente, o aumento de liquidez focada no "baixo-risco" pode ajudar, mas não garante o aumento de crédito à economia real dos países mais endividados onde isso é uma necessidade premente, e da qual depende a nossa capacidade de reembolso da dívida.
O enorme caudal de liquidez em Frankfurt vai chegar a conta-gotas a Amarante.
Isto porque mais liquidez (risk-free) não significa mais capacidade de crédito, nem mais capacidade de avaliar projectos e mutuários e de gerir carteiras de crédito. Liquidez é avulso. Crédito é dirigido, toma risco, assume perdas e faz reestruturações quando necessário. Tudo funções de intermediação que o sistema financeiro deixou de saber fazer.
Mas o Quantitative Easing QE não é panaceia. Falta um estímulo fiscal e orçamental nos países credores e superavitários, como a Alemanha, que não quer endividar-se nem para investir na renovação da sua infraestrutura que tanto precisa. Nos casos de distress, na Eurozone têm sido sempre os devedores, ou os contribuintes, a suportarem os custos do ajustamento, pouco os credores responsáveis pela bolha de crédito. Por isso o QE 2 não vai resolver o problema de divida excessiva, nem o da falta de receitas dos países devedores, que depende do aumento de exportações e do reequilíbrio comercial entre os 18 países da Eurozone.
Se a Alemanha e os outros credores promovessem politicas expansionistas, e partilhassem como credores o custo do ajustamento do credito excessivo, poder-se-ia separar o problema do credito do problema da moeda. Afinal também faltam "reformas estruturais" nos países credores que permitam isso.
Porque a divida insustentável é insustentável, seja em Euros seja noutra moeda qualquer.
Salvar o Euro não basta.
É essencial salvar as nossas economias e sociedades, massacradas com desemprego elevadíssimo e apertos de liquidez depressivos.
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Sources: Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-21/ecb-said-to-propose-qe-of-50-billion-euros-a-month-through-2016.html
Credit writedowns https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2014/02/ecbs-next-steps-could-involve-suspending-smp-sterilization-instant-qe.html
Público http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/bce-avanca-para-compra-de-divida-de-60-mil-milhoes-de-euros-por-mes-1683029
Economico http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/compra-de-divida-soberana-pelo-bce-nao-viola-lei-europeia_209866.html
