Tradutor

quinta-feira, março 17, 2011

Not Like a Virgin - bilateral responsability for trade deficits

In following the EU negotiations, it seems that the voices from Lisbon are too far away to be heard, in this center/periphery situation which is really a more traditional trade surplus/deficit situation.

According to an article in the EU Observer, http://euobserver.com/9/31993/?rk=1  :

      "Germany meanwhile managed to force the commission to back down in its insistence that macroeconomic imbalances can also come from excessive trade surpluses. …with Berlin winning what is termed an 'asymmetric' treatment of trade surpluses."

Historically, Portugal was capable of many feats, but running up a trade deficit by itself was not one of them.
There are no “Virgin trade deficits” nor Virgin excessive debt accumulations. The exporter/creditor father’s DNA can be easily traced.  Excessive debt is created by the unprudent creditor as much as by the foolish debtor.

If we recall basic trade theory correctly, there will be no adjustment solution which will not involve the rebalancing trade flows, with reductions in the surpluses and cuts in the deficits.
However, even if we don’t fully understand the implications of the current Eurozone negotiations,   it seems that the dominant net exporter/creditor position is likely to win out,  as usual, forcing the full burden of the trade adjustment on the net importer/debtor side.

This cannot but worry us all, as it augurs nothing good for the internal stability of the Single Currency and the Single Market.
. . . . .
A dívida monstruosa  é criada tanto pelo credor imprudente como pelo devedor incauto.  E é fácil saber quem é, quem é,  o "pai do monstro".  Na dívida, como na vida,  não há filhos de pais incógnitos, apenas filhos de pais irresponsáveis.

Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
Sources:  Jornal de Negócios  ; EU Observer 

4 comentários:

  1. If the consequence of the current EURO crisis is political "immobilismo", the cause may be voter "infantilismo".

    Everywhere voters are shocked-SHOCKED!- to find out that major adjustaments are needed. That's why voters are prone not only to reject bad news but to punish the few courageous messengers at the voting booth.

    To change this, things may have to get worse before they get better. German voters will have to accept that "there's no fee ever-increasing trade surplus", voters in the net importing countries will have to realize that they cannot live on ever-increasing credit forwever.

    Even Mr Berlusconi's indiscretions are insignificant next to this naked truth.

    ResponderEliminar
  2. "To receive contracts to supply submarines to Greece and Portugal, more than 62 million euros ($89.7 million) were paid between 2000 and 2007," the Munich prosecutors' office said in a statement on Monday," charging two former managers de Ferrostaal brought charges for bribery.

    Now we began to see the corruption behind the sovereign debt bubble.
    Should the Portuguese and the Greek cut salaries further to pay this submarine debt?

    ResponderEliminar
  3. As crises grega e portuguesa têm os mesmos elementos de base de qualquer outra crise: tentam evitar o inevitável, e no fim acabam por reestruturar, passam por um grande "stress" durante algum tempo e passado um ano ou dois voltam a crescer. O que sugiro à Grécia e a Portugal é que façam uma reescalonamento da sua dívida. Isto é, antes de um "default", deveriam chamar os credores e convencê-los que este é o momento para negociar novas condições. Os credores percebem quando as decisões são inevitáveis.

    ResponderEliminar
  4. O défice externo e o crédito externo são duas faces da mesma moeda.
    Isto é, o país com superavit de exportações (surplus country) tem que emprestar para qu o país em défice (deficit country) possa continuar a importar. Ou então tem de deixar revalorizar a sua moeda e exportar menos, para que o outro país passe a importar menos e possa começar a reembolsar a sua divida externa.

    ResponderEliminar