(Schäuble’s lament, in English below)
Pobres ministros, alvos de escutas e mirones em todo o lado!
Cada palavra, cada olhar, cada gesto é examinado sob o implacável microscópio da comunicação social e das redes sociais.
Dito isso, valia a pena comentar o desabafo do Ministro de Finanças alemão Wolfgang Schäuble que os membros do Bundestag e a opinião pública alemã não acreditam nas decisões relativas à Grécia.
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Testing the limits of divergence
How is Europe NOT like America in a crisis
Pobres ministros, alvos de escutas e mirones em todo o lado!
Cada palavra, cada olhar, cada gesto é examinado sob o implacável microscópio da comunicação social e das redes sociais.
Dito isso, valia a pena comentar o desabafo do Ministro de Finanças alemão Wolfgang Schäuble que os membros do Bundestag e a opinião pública alemã não acreditam nas decisões relativas à Grécia.
Como se pode interpretar isto?
Primeiro, parece que os alemães ainda não aceitam a sua quota parte de responsabilidade como credores irresponsáveis, a permitir que os bancos alemães fossem os mais alavancados da Europa e não só. Parece que a crise ainda não chegou suficientemente fundo para chamar os credores à responsabilidade, e os líderes alemães não tiveram coragem para assumir algumas verdades inconvenientes perante os seus eleitores.
Depois, parece que a solução imposta no caso da Grécia não convence, nem aos próprios alemães. A forte austeridade interna é combinada com um fortíssima tosquia aos credores privados, um Default que não é Default. Deixa-se ilesos os credores oficiais que são cada vez mais importantes. Isto ainda não vai à raiz do verdadeiro problema da divergência da competitividade entre os países da Eurozone, pois os países sobre-endividados continuam sem os mecanismos de ajustamento essenciais.
Terceiro, ninguém gosta de ver a triste desordem nas ruas de Atenas, mas quem se pode surpreender com isso? Talvez os alemães não conheçam o nosso velho ditado que "em casa onde não há pão, todos ralham e ninguém tem razão", mas recordam certamente o tumulto social que pode resultar do sobreendividamento.
As decisões e soluções relativas à Grécia serão tanto mais credíveis quando mais aderirem à dura realidade de que os sacrifícios têm que ser partilhados com os credores, e de que o ajustamento das frágeis economias periféricas terá que ser reflectido num ajustamento inverso nas fortes economias centrais.
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Testing the limits of divergence
How is Europe NOT like America in a crisis
Schäuble’s lament
Pity the ministers, always the target of eavesdropping and
prying eyes!
Every word, every look, every gesture is examined under the
unforgiving microscope of media and social networks.
That said, it may be worth commenting the outburst of the
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble who said that the members of the
Bundestag and the German public do not believe in the decisions being made
relating to Greece.
How to interpret this?
First, it seems that the Germans still do not accept their
share of responsibility as excessive lenders, having permitted German banks to become the most leveraged in Europe
and beyond. It seems that the crisis is not yet deep enough to call the
creditors to account, and the German leaders are afraid to place these
inconvenient truths before their voters.
Further, it appears that the solution imposed in the case of
Greece does not convince anyone, not even the Germans themselves. Strong
domestic austerity combined with a severe “haircut” to private creditors, in a non-Default
Default. A solution that exempts the official creditors who are taking
over more and more of the debt. But this
does not yet get to the root of the problem of divergence in competitiveness among
the countries in the Eurozone, since the
over-indebted countries continue without the necessary adjustment mechanisms.
Third, although nobody likes to see the sad disorder on the streets of Athens, who is surprised by it?
Maybe the Germans don’t know the old Portuguese saying that "in a
home without bread, everyone gripes and no one is right", but they
certainly should be able recall the social turmoil that can result from over-indebtedness, from their own experience.
Decisions and solutions for Greece will be all the more
credible to the extent that they respect the harsh reality that sacrifices have to be shared with creditors,
and that the adjustment of the fragile peripheral economies have to be matched by reciprocal adjustments in the strong export economies such as Germany and the Netherlands..
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
The really interesting bit is Schäuble's lament that "the Bundestag and the German public opinion" don't believe in the decisions regarding Greece".
ResponderEliminarThat is, the German (creditors) still see de over-indebtedness only as THEIR (debtors') problem, not as OUR (creditors' and debtors') joint problem.
Perhaps they believe in "virgin debt", excessive borrowing without excessive lending, something aking to the Virgin birth of yore.
Unless and until the problem is seen as a COMMON problem, there will be NO sustainable solution, COMMON or otherwise.
See more on the view from the periphery in the blog PPP Lusofonia
German minister signals support for Portugal
ResponderEliminara Grécia é o sintoma, não é a doença
ResponderEliminarLer mais: http://aeiou.expresso.pt/europa-a-cegueira-que-mata=f704239#ixzz1mLinSKed
It is worse than misleading to see the debate in terms of "northern versus southern "Europe".
ResponderEliminarIt would be more honest to to look at the problem of overextended creditors jockeying with overleveraged debtors to avoid taking joint responsibility for a COMMON problem.
The official creditors and bail-out funds have been helping mostly the overextended creditors by taking over the maturing debt at par, in the absence of a stand-still or suspension of payments, leaving the remaining private sector creditors to face ever bigger discounts.
And until creditors and debtors accept the JOINT origin of the problem, there will no way to reverse the divergence of the Eurozone external accounts, Euro or no-Euro.
Germans were amongst the biggest buyers of not only U.S. subprime-mortgage-backed C.D.O.’s but also Greek debt.
ResponderEliminarThey have been generating such surpluses and wealth for so long that they can afford to squander some of it.
The Eurozone...by opening all European markets to German manufactured goods, it created a big market for Germany to sell into, thus making it easier for them to become big and strong. Secondly, and more insidious, by essentially putting Germany in the position of the stiffed creditor of its European counter-parties, it changes the tone of relations between Germany and everybody else.
This tone of relations seems to be shifting rather rapidly from still feeling ever so slightly guilty about the Holocaust to being pissed that everyone owes them money
It is a great temptation to reduce a complex global economic crisis to cultural stereotypes, north versus south
ResponderEliminarShauble's lament is not about credible threats to the overleveraged borroweres, but more about the German exporters' illusion that the debt problem is the fault of the importers. That is, about the Bundestag and German public opinion not seeing the credible threat to the lenders.
ResponderEliminarAbusive lending practices:
ResponderEliminarPredatory lending has been described as a mismatch between loan and the needs and capacity of the borrower, that is, the loan does fit the borrower, either because the borrower's underlying needs for the loans are not being met, or the terms of the loan are so disadvantageous to the particular borrower that there is little likelyhood that the borrower has the capacity to repay the loan.
Schauble diz na reunião do FMI em Tokyo, que os problemas da Grécia são gregos.
ResponderEliminarIsto é, os credores, incluindo os bancos alemães, estão inocentes de qualquer responsabilidade pelo sobre-endividamento
Schäuble and Gaspar:
ResponderEliminarOld fox, new chicken