PPP Lusofonia é um blog de economia e finanças, focado nos serviços públicos e no investimento para o desenvolvimento, e nas PPP. O blog dedica-se a (a) conceitos de economia, finanças e banca (b) às necessidades dos PALOPs e (c)oportunidades de consultoria nos PALOPs, com artigos em português ou inglês. PLEASE USE THE TRANSLATE BUTTON. PPPs, development financing in Lusophone Countries Autora: Mariana ABRANTES de Sousa
Tradutor
quarta-feira, novembro 30, 2011
As PPP no memorando da Troika, 19-Dezembro, UCP
A (balance of payments) crisis by any other name
In Asia, it was seen as a banking crisis, in Europe it's now seen as a sovereign debt crisis, but in fact the crises nearly always originate in foreign trade and balance of payments imbalances.
Therefore, we need to explore the causality in more detail, from the current account deficits financed by hot money capital inflows, made possible by over-extended foreign banks and over-leveraged local borroweres. When these flows reverse suddenly, it causes a local financial contraction.
From where we sit in Lisbon, we have to wonder whether such "free capital flows" are such a good thing after all. In fact, they prove to be anything but "free".
See: Hot money
Hedge funds are commonly blamed for the recent financial crises in Asia and Russia, but banks were the real culprits
Banco de Portugal reforça supervisão bancária
De Irina Melo (LUSA) – há 2 dias
Lisboa, 28 nov (Lusa) -- O Banco de Portugal (BdP) vai ver os seus poderes reforçados pelo Governo para intervir em bancos numa situação financeira difícil, segundo a legislação hoje publicada em Diário da República, que regula a liquidação de instituições bancárias.
O diploma autoriza o Governo a rever a partir de terça-feira o regime de saneamento e liquidação de instituições bancárias supervisionadas pelo BdP.
Segundo esta regulamentação, o supervisor vai poder estabelecer mecanismos de intervenção preventiva e corretiva nos bancos, criando uma fase de administração provisória pelo supervisor, bem como definir os termos de uma eventual liquidação de algum banco.
Fonte: Lusa
Comentário:
Portugal tem poucos instrumentos de ajustamento no contexto do Mercado Único e da Moeda Única, essencialmente a politica fiscal e orçamental. Mas também pode utilizar a política de crédito e a regulação prudencial do sistema bancário.
Portugal pode e deve cortar o crédito ao consumo, reforçar os esquemas de garantias de depósitos e promover e proteger as poupanças locais. Estas são medidas essenciais que estão ao nosso alcance.
Pagar taxas de juros reais positivas aos aforradores e depositantes locais será central a qualquer solução. No entanto, em vez de promover a poupança, as autoridades bancárias estão a intervir para limitar as taxas de juros nos depósitos, aplicando uma dedução aos fundos próprios dos bancos l que paguem taxas de juros elevadas, acima de 6%.
terça-feira, novembro 29, 2011
TdC: Sociedades pouco comerciais facilitam desorçamentação do investimento público
Não basta avaliar o veículo ou instrumento utilizado para a realização do investimento público, é essencial avaliar os resultados, o impacto do investimento no crescimento económico, na dívida pública e externa, e na sustentabilidade orçamental.
domingo, novembro 27, 2011
Lessons from past crises ... analytical deficits
The recent evaluations of Jean-Claude Trichet's tenure as head of the ECB-European Central Bank,as in the Economist article of 22-October-2011, are quite off the mark:
1. For most of Trichet's term, the Euro was not stable but rather too strong, reaching USD1.60 at times, doing much damage to the weaker Eurozone exporters, who would hardly consider this "impecable".
2. The failure to "perceive the processes that culminated in the current crisis" is a continuing problem, as declining interest rates are seen to have "spurred a great deal of borrowing that fed prodigious construction booms". Someone needs to ask what spurred the corresponding lending surge, the Basel gnomes?
3. The Bundesbank, Bank of France and Bank of England, the NCBs, not the ECB, "chose to ignore the dangers in the credit surge which allowed the build-up of current account imbalances", both the "deficits on the periphery" and the corresponding surplus in the net exporting countries. The national central banks were, and still are, tasked with prudential regulation, they are the entitities that should now be responsible for recapitalization of the overextended banks, but they appear to be missing in action.
4. If the ECB "believed, wrongly, that countries within a monetary union no longer faced balance of payments constrainsts", it was not alone in this error. In its Eco Conjuncture of January 2011, the BNP Paribas Economics Research Department wrote:
"Wider current account deficits can be considered normal (sic) in a monetary union which is free from foreign exchange risk. By devloping their comparative strengths, some countries specialise .... It would make no sense to require all members of a monetary union to achieve the same performance in terms of price competitiveness and to have balanced foreign accounts.... Even so, wider external deficits...signal internal imbalances that must be financed by the exterior and that could become unsustainable"
Perhaps we need a quick refresher course in double entry bookkeeping to recall that
1. In bilateral intra-Eurozone trade, there can be no execessive trade deficit without an execessive trade surplus
2. For every irresponsable overleveraged borrower there is an equal an opposite imprudent overextended lender. That's why banks require "prudential" regulation, which continues to fail miserably, as even the responsability of bank recapitalization is now being pushed onto the ECB.
When and if the Eurozone crisis is over, in our life time we trust, economic historians will produce many verdicts on the causes and consequences, on the sins of commission and ommission. On balance, they will judge the surplus/creditor countries just as harshly as the deficit/borrowing countries, unless they suffer from their own analytical deficit, as do the articles quoted above.
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Ver também - Licões de crises passadas , and
... for every irreponsible borrower there is an equal and opposite irresponsible lender ...
EFAPCO to kick-start 2012 with calls to Euro-Action
The final programme for the 5 th EFAPCO Congress showcases the Federation’s most ambitious programme to date.
Organised by APECATE, the Portuguese Association of Congress, Outdoor Leisure and Cultural and Event Companies, the event is themed: “The World has Changed. Start Acting”.
It is expected to bring delegates from the Federation’s 13 member countries, and further afield, to the high-tech Estoril Congress Center, one of the “greenest” complexes of its type in the world.
“Our January 13 and 14 programme has been devised to interest specialists from all sectors of the meetings industry,” said EFAPCO President, Nicolas Le Brun.
The event starts off, the previous evening, January 12, when EFAPCO’s new President and Board will be elected at the Federation’s General Assembly.
Internationally-renowned speakers are set to examine ways in which to tackle the current economic crisis and illustrate the opportunities this activity will offer.
Speakers include:
- Rohit Talwar – CEO of Fast Future Research
- José Manuel Bastos – Head of Unit Conference Organisation at the European Commission (DG SCIC) speaking about conference organisation as a key communication tool in the European Commission
- Isabella Lenarduzzi – Founder and Managing Director of JUMP speaking about “Empowering Women, Advancing the Economy”
- James Latham – Producer at MEETINGS:review, Development Director and Co-Founder of Telecom TV and Decisive Media
- Jonathan Bradshaw – Meetings Performance Consultant Founder & CEO – The Meetology® Group
The line-up also features: Anne De Smet, Managing Director of Momentum and President of EFAPCO’s Belgian member, BAPCO; Mariana Abrantes de Sousa,Independent Financial Consultant;Rodrigo Moita de Deus, General Manager of NextPower;
Diogo Assis Chairman of events by tlc; Pedro Rocha dos Santos, Director of the Estoril Congress Center and Vice President of ICCA IberianChapter; Gavin Eccles, associate with Neoturis, Tourism Consultancy and
Paola Casentini – Managing director of Motivation M.I.C.E. srl, and President of MPI Italia.
The Congress will again host a Future Leaders Forum offering some of the brightest students in the global meetings and incentive travel industry a large range of insights into how to build successful careers in the expanding meetings and events industry.
Developed and organised jointly by the IMEX Group and MPI, the Forum was held, with great success, alongside the last EFAPCO Congress, in Brussels.
EFAPCO Vice President Helena Weinstein, who is hosting the Estoril Congress, said: “It should give the Forum students another excellent experience of our industry.”
Information about all the keynote speakers plus summaries of their presentations can be found at: www.efapco2012.com.
And, she added: “Because the Congress is a “green” event in an ultra-green Center I would urge all delegates to register on-line at:
http://www.efapco2012.com/registration_/3029-registration.html
quarta-feira, novembro 23, 2011
Lições de crises passadas - exportar mais, importar menos
Para este ajustamento espectacular, Portugal recorreu a todos os instrumentos e ajustamento tradicionais, nomeadamente
- desvalorização cambial para alterar os preços relativos
- subida das tarifas alfandegárias
- subida da taxa de juro real para promover a poupança
- subida de impostos para cortar o consumo, incluindo de bens importados
- promoção das exportações
- restrições de crédito, quase total proibição de credito ao consumo e reorientação do crédito para o sector exportador
- etc ...
Agora que Portugal está numa crise externa ainda mas grave, o que teríamos de fazer para conseguir uma recuperação de 30 pontos percentuais no rácio de cobertura?
Seria possível passar da actual cobertura de 74% para cima de 100%, de défice para superavit na balança comercial?
Alguém duvida que é isto mesmo que temos que fazer, eliminar o défice estrutural externo de uma vez por todas a fim de poder começar a amortizar a enorme dívida externa?
Mais que exportar, vamos ter que fazer cortes violentos nas importações.
Mas a realidade é que ainda não fizemos quase nada para trabalhar para o superavit comercial, e o Natal que se aproxima vai ser mais uma orgia de "artigos importados", a começar pelo "bacalhau da Noruega" e viagens de fim de ano às Caraíbas. O défice comercial nem sequer está no radar dos decisores políticos nem da troika, que insistem em focar os indicadores secundários do défice orçamental.
Recorde-se que estamos a importar alimentos da mesma Noruega que ficou fora do da EU e do Mercado Único a fim de proteger a sua agricultura.
Os ministros de Economia bem têm tentado reorientar as intenções. Manuel Pinho fez um dos primeiros congressos de empresas exportadoras. Alvaro Santos Pereira quer reduzir os defices do sector não-transaccionável e promover as exportações. Está no bom caminho, mas tem que ir mais longe, tem que cortar nas importações.
Apesar de estas tentativas notáveis, ainda estamos a repetir o erro do instrumento: Para quem só tem um martelo, tudo lhe parece um prego. Sem os instrumentos tradicionais de ajustamento, sem politica cambial, sem politica monetária, sem politica de capitais, sem politica de comércio externo, um dos erros de Maastricht é de focar todos os esforços na politica fiscal e orçamental. Mas ainda nos resta a política de crédito, a politica de investimento e essas também devem ser reorientadas para o verdadeiro problema do défice externo.
Compete-nos recordar que a austeridade orçamental é um condição necessária mas não suficiente para sairmos da crise. Pior que um diagnóstico errado, é um diagnóstico ditado pelas fracas soluções disponíveis.
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
PPP Lusofonia
Ver o artigo de Óscar Afonso e Álvaro Aguiar (2004) "Comércio Externo e Crescimento da Economia Portuguesa no Século XX , ( Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)
http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/04.05.06_WP146_Afonso%20e%20Aguiar.pdf
e se a troika estiver errada ?
e One-armed midgets can't guarantee intra-Eurozone adjustment
e Lições da crise de 1982: D. Carlos primeiro nos sacrifícios
e Lessons from past crises - Analytical Deficits
terça-feira, novembro 22, 2011
Current account deficit might be a bad thing...
Lecture notes from Northwestern U:
Here is a second example where a negative current account might be a bad thing.
Suppose the government of a particular country offers guarantees to foreign lenders who finance domestic investment projects. This has the effect of reducing the foreigners’ risk exposure, and so
they are less reluctant to get involved with investment projects. This is likely to boost I ,
and produce a large current account deficit. But, this may not be a good thing. Government
involvement in effect makes taxpayers part of the deal. If the investment goes well, the
foreign lenders and the domestic borrower do well. If it goes bad, the foreign lender still
does well, the domestic borrower’s loss is limited, and the taxpayer picks up the real tab.
Now, this may be fine if the government’s decision to commit the taxpayer has carefully
taken into account the interests of the taxpayer. But, if not, then in effect the interests
of an important party to the transaction have not been taken into account.
Interestingly, the ‘taxpayer’ in this example is not necessarily just a domestic citizen. In practice it may
even involve taxpayers in the world as a whole. To the extent that international financial
organizations stand ready to bail out governments that get into trouble, those organizations
6in effect place the taxpayers of the countries they represent at risk. So, a current account
deficit may be bad if it is fueled by investments that are implicitly guaranteed by taxpayers,
when the interests of those taxpayers have not been taken into account.
Are these concerns in practice? Many people say they are. A feature of the Asian
economies that experienced financial crises in late 1997, is that their governments offered
guarantees to foreign lenders. It is generally thought that when those guarantees were extended, the interests of the taxpayers were not fully taken into account. Asian governments
are often accused of engaging in ‘crony capitalism’, where members of the government extended guarantees on projects run by family members or prospective business associates,
without worrying about the interests of the taxpayers they represent.
...
Source: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lchrist/362/w2003/lect1.pdf
E se a troika estiver errada? - Massa Monetária
21 Nov 2011 14:32
Colocado por: Rui Peres Jorge
O enquadramento de políticas postas em prática através de programas de ajustamento da UE/FMI é, na minha perspectiva, inconsistente e perigoso. A crise da dívida soberana europeia é, na verdade, uma crise da balança de pagamentos e de dívida externa
"Não é essa a forma que se aprende/ensina a abordar problemas de índole orçamental nas universidades. Com frequência essas temáticas são abordadas em disciplinas diferentes (e.g., finanças públicas para défice orçamental e macroeconomia para balança de pagamentos). Em resultado a óptica adoptada no tratamento de desequilíbrios orçamentais é, na prática, microeconómica [ignorando-se a dimensão macroeconómica que é fundamental]. Por exemplo, nos EUA, no actual debate de redução do défice público desse país, discute-se apenas cortes de despesas (e programas) e aumentos de impostos, sem qualquer referência ao défice comercial e às necessidades líquidas de financiamento da economia. É verdadeiramente inacreditável que assim seja, mas é o que continua a ocorrer"
Governo vai divulgar todos os contratos de PPP
domingo, novembro 20, 2011
Novo blog 10envolver promove literacia económica
https://10envolver.wordpress.com/
Autor: Pedro G. Rodrigues
Doutorado em economia pela UNL. Investigador em macroeconomia e finanças públicas. Professor no ISCSP-UTL. Ph.D. in Economics (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal).
His research spans macroeconomics and public finance.
Professor @ www.iscsp.utl.pt
...
Outros econblogs interessantes:
http://momentoseconomicos.wordpress.com/ de Pedro Pita Barros, da UNL
e http://theportugueseeconomy.blogspot.com/ de diversos
Massa monetária http://comunidade.xl.pt/JNEGOCIOS/blogs/massamonetaria/default.aspx
António Borges speaks about the Eurozone crisis
Antonio Borges, the (recently resigned) Director of the European Department of the IMF, spoke to SIEPR Associates at Stanford University about the European debt crisis and what can be done.
Source: 10envolver/wordpress.com
Topics of the presentation of Antonio Borges on the Eurozone crisis:
- What's at stake
- Causes of the current crisis
- Incomplete monetary union
- Current developments and risks
- Support vs Discipline
- What should be done
Yes, growth-oriented budget discipline can be done. And cutting pension benefits also helps to reduce hidden liabilities.
But the national central banks could do more to work together, instead of pushing the "loose lending" problems on each other.
What needs to be done is to focus on rebalancing the trade and current account deficits/surpluses within the Eurozone.
This will require many changes which are not in the "troika" play lists.
See also Of banks, Central Banks and moral hazard, ... easy credit at at root of the crisis
Os contratos PPP são, por definição, opacos...3
(Continuação, ver parte 1 e parte 2 )
Está previsto que até Março uma consultora internacional face uma análise das PPP que podem ser renegociadas...
Ver mais sobre Unidades de PPP em http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.com/2010/11/agencia-das-ppps.html
Os contratos PPP são, por definição, opacos...2
Entrevista com Mariana Abrantes de Sousa publicada no Jornal de Negócios a 15-Novembro-2011