Post contractual lock-in in UK PFI

Lonsdale, C. (2005) 'Post-Contractual Lock-in and the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI): The cases of National savings and investments and the Lord Chancellor's Department'. Public administration, 83(1), p.67–88.

 According to the UK government, one of the key features of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is the scope it provides to transfer risk to private sector suppliers. Under the PFI, public bodies are expected to develop interdependent relationships with suppliers that allow risk to be transferred. However, it is the argument of the author that it will not always be possible for interdependent relationships to be engineered by public bodies – on many occasions, public bodies will find themselves asymmetrically locked-in to their supplier. This situation leads to private sector suppliers becoming dominant in those relationships which, in turn, will allow them to pass back risk and obtain greater returns. As a result, the author argues that it is not a question of whether risk can be transferred under the PFI, but when. This argument is illustrated by use of the contracts managed by the UK National Savings and Investments and the UK Lord Chancellor's Department.
Lonsdale, C. (2005) 'Risk Transfer and the UK Private Finance Initiative: a theoretical analysis'. Policy & Politics, 33(2), p.231–249.
Lonsdale, C. and Watson, G. (2007) 'Managing contracts under the UK’s Private Finance Initiative: evidence from the National Health Service'. Policy & Politics, 35(4), p.683–700.
Lonsdale, C. and Watson, G. (2007) 'Managing contracts under the UK’s Private Finance Initiative: evidence from the National Health Service'. Policy & Politics, 35(4), p.683–700.
Commentary
PPP Agencies  http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2011/03/agencia-das-ppps-e-sustentabilidade.html

Seems very similar to the concept of "Captura do Concedente" similar to but more risky than capture of the Regulator, due to higher opacity and lower levels of disclosure and transparency. 

Reed more about PPP organizational and governance issues in 

PPP Agency and Budget Sustainability http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2010/12/agencia-das-ppps-e-sustentabilidade.html

Intentional Instituitional Weaknesss http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2012/03/cansadode-ouvir-falar-de-e-de-ppps-eu.html

Abrantes on Managing PPPs for Budget Sustainability, the Experience of Portugal http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2009/09/managing-ppp-for-budget-sustainability.html

S. Ping Ho on Game Theory and PPPs http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2009/01/teoria-de-jogos-e-renegociao-de-ppp.html

Regulator orders, Concedent pays http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2012/10/regulador-manda-concedente-paga.html