Debt workout 101 - part 2
The proposal for a new EU commissioner of budgetary discipline is interesting, but unfortunately misguided. The EU already has 27 "prudential regulators", the central bankers which allowed the surplus country banks to overextend and finance the overleveraging of the deficit countries.
Credit bubbles have more to do with failures of prudential regulation than with failures of public finance management, though these cannot be minimzed.
The misguided Maastricht criteria focused all the attention on the domestic deficits, which were manipulated with the help of the same foreign banks, while ignoring the ballooning problems of the unsustainable intra-Eurozone external deficits and external debt.
At this point, the costs for Greece of a hard default are probably lower than the costs of exiting the Euro, since they have to go on a crash debt diet anyway.
After all, whatever the governing law or currency, all unsustainable debt has to be, either:
1. paid by the borrower or by a willing 3rd party/guarantor
2. restructured, renegotiated and extended, or
3. written off and/or forgiven by the creditor
The only difference is who suffers how much of the losses, and which lawyers gain, local or "international".
The proposal for a new EU commissioner of budgetary discipline is interesting, but unfortunately misguided. The EU already has 27 "prudential regulators", the central bankers which allowed the surplus country banks to overextend and finance the overleveraging of the deficit countries.
Credit bubbles have more to do with failures of prudential regulation than with failures of public finance management, though these cannot be minimzed.
The misguided Maastricht criteria focused all the attention on the domestic deficits, which were manipulated with the help of the same foreign banks, while ignoring the ballooning problems of the unsustainable intra-Eurozone external deficits and external debt.
At this point, the costs for Greece of a hard default are probably lower than the costs of exiting the Euro, since they have to go on a crash debt diet anyway.
After all, whatever the governing law or currency, all unsustainable debt has to be, either:
1. paid by the borrower or by a willing 3rd party/guarantor
2. restructured, renegotiated and extended, or
3. written off and/or forgiven by the creditor
The only difference is who suffers how much of the losses, and which lawyers gain, local or "international".
Mariana Abrantes de Sousa
See also Mais juizo orçamental não depende de mais juízes in PPP Lusofonia
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lendes play 3 Orderly Default
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lenders play 1 pre-default
Artigo de Mariana Abrantes de Sousa, A gestão de risco de crédito com principal factor de sucesso bancário, Revista da Banca, Setembro 1992
See also Mais juizo orçamental não depende de mais juízes in PPP Lusofonia
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lendes play 3 Orderly Default
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lenders play 1 pre-default
Artigo de Mariana Abrantes de Sousa, A gestão de risco de crédito com principal factor de sucesso bancário, Revista da Banca, Setembro 1992
High Noon Approaching for Greece?
by Edward Hugh
Sources: http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/high-noon-approaching-for-greece/
and the Dutch proposal in http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5284d4a4-d93a-11e0-884e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XRa8z86n
and the Dutch proposal in http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5284d4a4-d93a-11e0-884e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XRa8z86n
The proposed bond swap that constitutes the core of the private sector involvement (PSI) in Greece’s second bailout program covering the exchange of 135 billion euros in Greek debt, of which 90% is under Greek law, at a loss of about 21 percent loss for a new package of longer-dated securities with AAA backing issued under international law.
Essential to protect local savers who must be central to the solution
ResponderEliminarDefault and restructuring: "It’s a given at this point that private debt will be massively written down whether Greece stays in or out of the euro" ?
And orderly default and restructuring has to have lower costs for both the borrower and the lenders than a disorderly exit from the euro, default, new debt issues, etc.
An orderly default has got to provide for a stand-still, avoid collateral grabs and other unseemly gambits, otherwise it's not "orderly". Coss-default clauses should function accross all the issues, unless the local and international lawyers didn't do their job, placing all existing debt on as due and payable, pari passu.
The analysis of the governing law of the individual bond issues seems to turn the domestic/external debt question on its head, raising the critical issue no one is discussing , which is how to protect local depositors and investors.
Since the problem is one of excess external debt, a traditional external debt restructuring would penalize only the cross border external (foreign currency) debt. If domestic investors suffer (bigger) losses on their "national savings", what are they to do, shift their saving into foreign bonds?
There you have it, Argentina on the Mediterranean, a la "curralito".
It's high time that an orderly solution be found for the Eurozone debt crisis, one that is consistent with long term recovery, and that means favouring not penalizing local savers, since they were never part of the cross-border debt problem and they have to be central to the solution.
Ver exposição dos credores
http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.com/2011/07/distribuicao-da-exposicao-bancaria-da.html
Wanted: Prudent Central Bankers
ResponderEliminarUnder home rule, a few good prudential central bankers would have kept their banks at home and prevented them from overextending so much credit to such foolish borrowers.
That is, a few good prudent central bankers in Frankfurt, Paris and London could have prevented the intra-Eurozone debt crisis.
VER http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.com/2011/06/banks-central-banks-and-moral-hazard-in.html