The proposal for a new EU commissioner of budgetary discipline is interesting, but unfortunately misguided. The EU already has 27 "prudential regulators", the central bankers which allowed the surplus country banks to overextend and finance the overleveraging of the deficit countries.
Credit bubbles have more to do with failures of prudential regulation than with failures of public finance management, though these cannot be minimzed.
The misguided Maastricht criteria focused all the attention on the domestic deficits, which were manipulated with the help of the same foreign banks, while ignoring the ballooning problems of the unsustainable intra-Eurozone external deficits and external debt.
At this point, the costs for Greece of a hard default are probably lower than the costs of exiting the Euro, since they have to go on a crash debt diet anyway.
After all, whatever the governing law or currency, all unsustainable debt has to be, either:
1. paid by the borrower or by a willing 3rd party/guarantor
2. restructured, renegotiated and extended, or
3. written off and/or forgiven by the creditor
The only difference is who suffers how much of the losses, and which lawyers gain, local or "international".
See also Mais juizo orçamental não depende de mais juízes in PPP Lusofonia
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lendes play 3 Orderly Default
Debt workout 101 - Games borrowers and lenders play 1 pre-default
Artigo de Mariana Abrantes de Sousa, A gestão de risco de crédito com principal factor de sucesso bancário, Revista da Banca, Setembro 1992
by Edward Hugh
and the Dutch proposal in http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5284d4a4-d93a-11e0-884e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XRa8z86n